

# **Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding**

## ***Version for Field Application & Testing***

We invite colleagues to use this framework to support groups that are attempting to achieve collective impacts in conflict contexts—before, during or in the aftermath of violence.

We assume that it will need adaptation to each setting and the needs of the consortium, network or platform involved. We only ask that you let us know the results of the process.

Please send feedback and experiences to Sweta Velpillay at [svelpillay@cdacollaborative.org](mailto:svelpillay@cdacollaborative.org)

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An electronic copy of this resource is available on the CDA website at [cdacollaborative.org](http://cdacollaborative.org)

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Many colleagues at CDA have contributed ideas and time to the development of this Framework, including Diana Chigas, Anita Ernstorfer, and Isabella Jean. More recently, Sweta Velpillay has been contributing her considerable experience to the effort. A consultation that focused on an earlier draft of the Framework included those Humanity United and CDA colleagues already noted, as well as Karen Gratten, Graeme Simpson, Lena Slachmuis, Leslie Wingender, Susan Allen, Lara Olson, Joe Hewitt, Aaron Chassy, Marin O'Brien Belhoussein, Margarita Tadevosyan, Liz Hume, Rob Ricigliano, and Marc Behrendt.

Finally, we should acknowledge the considerable work over many years by the team at FSG. As you will see, this Framework builds on their model, adapting it to the peacebuilding context. We are grateful for their pioneering work for collective impact.



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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Models can be dangerous. If misused or misinterpreted, they can suggest that there is a formula or set series of steps that, if followed faithfully, will lead to predictable results. In the peacebuilding and conflict prevention arena, this is an absurd notion. Conflict contexts are extremely varied and dynamic, requiring constant renewal of analyses and adaptive management in response to changing conditions and learning in response to actions for peace. In fact, the overall “model” for effective peacebuilding should embody adaptive management in relation to constantly updated and systemic analysis of the key drivers of conflict. We suggest that the concept of a “framework” implies greater flexibility than a “model”—and have used that language in this paper, which is intended as the basis for field testing and refinement.

Development of this framework aims to achieve a clear goal: greater impact from collective efforts towards peace. That is, even if peace practitioners improve the effectiveness of their individual programmatic actions, collectively, they may not achieve sufficient impacts at a systemic level. Hence the need for a framework for collective impact to help ensure that disparate actions by multiple dedicated actors become mutually supportive and create effective synergies to accelerate and sustain progress towards durable peace.

In developing this framework for collective impact in peacebuilding, we started with the Collective Impact model provided by FSG in a series of articles in the *Stanford Social Innovation Review*.<sup>2</sup> In doing so, we recognize that the FSG approach has certain limitations, and also benefits from many years of experience among networks dedicated to justice and peace in many dimensions, mostly within the United States context plus a few international examples. In fact, some experienced experts in coalition building and networking have offered critiques of the Collective Impact model—and we have attempted to account for those critiques in offering this framework for collective impact in peacebuilding.<sup>3</sup>

As we shall see in the text below, the Collective Impact model needs significant adaptation or adjustment to make it applicable to the peacebuilding context, as even the minimum criteria or preconditions for collective impact, as suggested by FSG, are rarely entirely met in conflict zones. We have also completed a literature review to identify other possible approaches to collective action and/or coordination that could complement (or contradict!) the FSG framework.<sup>4</sup> While the

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<sup>1</sup> While this paper refers to collective impact in “peacebuilding,” this term should be understood broadly to include conflict prevention, efforts to promote peace in the midst of war/violent conflict, and post-war consolidation of peace and the prevention of further cycles of violence. It is our assumption, also, that “upstream” conflict prevention efforts ultimately must address the same factors as atrocities prevention. However, the crisis intervention modes in relation to conflict and atrocities may look somewhat different.

<sup>2</sup> Kania, John and Mark Kramer, “Collective Impact.” *Stanford Social Innovation Review*: 36-41, 2011. “Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work.” Fay Hanleybrown, John Kania, and Mark Kramer, *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, January 2013. “Embracing Emergence: How Collective Impact Addresses Complexity.” John Kania and Mark Kramer, *Stanford Innovation Review*, January 2012

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Tom Wolff, “Ten Places Where Collective Impact Gets It Wrong,” *Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice*, March 2016.

<sup>4</sup> See Marin O’Brien Belhoussein, “Developing a Model for Collective Impact for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Summary of Initial Findings,” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, May 2016.

available research and commentaries are neither extensive nor deep, some useful ideas and cautions have emerged—and these have been incorporated in the framework as presented below.

As a key step in developing this framework, we shared a draft with a range of colleagues and convened a one-day consultation in Washington in July 2016. This current document incorporates feedback received during that event.

***Who might use this framework?*** As we elaborate the elements of a framework, we imagine a range of entities that might use it, including:

- An emerging coalition or network of local organizations wishing to increase the results of their peace efforts
- An international peacebuilding NGO, private foundation or coalition/consortium intending to support local actors and organizations to undertake complementary actions and/or to supplement official peace processes
- A donor or group of donors wishing to increase the effectiveness of their grant making and/or the impacts of grant recipients
- A UN official, UN agency or regional intergovernmental organization (e.g., a Special Representative of the Secretary General or UN Resident Coordinator or UN Peacebuilding Fund/Commission) wishing to a) improve the impacts of the UN “family” itself; and/or b) increase effectiveness of the international community as a whole or regional initiatives in relation to a peace process or post-violence peacebuilding efforts
- A government peace commission or ministry tasked with consolidating peace or preventing future violent conflict

Each of these entities faces a common challenge: how to harness the energies and initiatives of multiple groups and individuals towards achievement of the shared goal of durable peace. While applications of the framework by these different groups must differ in important respects, the fundamental tasks remain similar.

## Fundamental Principles Underlying Collective Impact in Peacebuilding

Before delving into the FSG model for collective impact, we would offer the following summary of key principles that should inform any effort to promote greater collaboration and cooperation among peace actors. These are extracted from the lively discussion among practitioners and academics during the July 2016 consultation.

1. *Local actors and organizations* must drive and control collective impact efforts. The role of external organizations is to provide support and reflections from other experiences. Pay attention to *issues of power, privilege and control*.
2. *All organizations, and especially "outsiders," must recognize their own motivations and agendas—and be as transparent as possible about them.*
3. *Bottom-up processes* are more likely to achieve sustained successes than initiatives driven from the top or externally.
4. *Vertical and horizontal linkages* must be built into peacebuilding initiatives.
5. *Learning processes* must provide the core of collective impact processes. Flows of information, analyses and responses are crucial activities across participating organizations.
6. How *funding* is provided and how *accountability* is structured influence the ability to promote collective impact; accountability should generally be to those most affected by war and violence. *Longer-term commitments* to key issues are important.
7. *Inclusivity* must be a consideration from the outset—balanced with the need to be able to act and achieving a "sufficient" group of organizations operating from a common agenda.
8. *Participatory analysis* must include as many perspectives as practical—using systems tools and supporting an *adaptive and learning approach* to programming. Analysis and learning are *iterative processes*.
9. Efforts must be motivated by a sense of the *importance* of the issues, *durability* and *sustainability*—rather than "urgency," which can lead to short-term and transitory efforts with no lasting effects on fundamental drivers of conflict.
10. *Incremental building* of the collective action is advised—with room for *reconfiguring* (adding and dropping organizations) over time and phases of action.
11. The *incentives* for participating in collective impact for peacebuilding must be considered.

Quite apart from the preliminary considerations, preconditions and five core conditions for collective impact discussed below, adherence to these principles is paramount.

## Preliminary Considerations

### Overall Approach

As noted in the Introduction above, we are assuming two fundamental principles underlying efforts to achieve collective action and impact in peacebuilding:

*A systemic understanding of conflict dynamics and systems change.* Conflict analysis must push beyond traditional frameworks and tools to add a systems dimension. We have generally used systems thinking and tools for mapping of conflict, although other tools are available. Conflict mapping/analysis is necessary but not sufficient; tools for identifying points of leverage and ways to induce positive change in conflict systems are also needed. Thus we suggest use of a range of tools for ensuring that analysis is translated into robust and operations strategies.

*An adaptive management approach to program planning and implementation.* Colleagues engaged in the development and humanitarian relief arenas are increasingly trying to move away from rigid programming regimes (such as result-based management and the ubiquitous logframe). The need for flexible and adaptive action is even more pronounced for peacebuilding, where there are no “proven” methods for change, and the objects of change (conflict dynamics) are in constant flux. Adaptive management requires frequently updated conflict analysis, a regular flow of information/feedback regarding the effects and results of program activities, and program management structures that are designed to respond to conflict analysis and feedback.

Each of these principles could be the subject of considerable elaboration and identification of specific tools and methods, but we are simply restating them here to note that they inform the rest of the framework.

### Initial Assessment and Strategy Development

Before engaging fully in the process of collective impact among multiple organizations, several preliminary actions are needed, in order to ensure that a collaborative effort is well conceived, targeted and resourced. These are outlined below, and include 1) initial stakeholder mapping to identify the potential range of stakeholders that could be involved; 2) identification/convening of a sufficient network; 3) performance of a preliminary conflict analysis; 4) initial decision regarding the appropriate level of collective action (local, national...); and 5) preliminary determination of the intended focus and scope of collective impact. At this stage, all of the actions and products are initial, preliminary or provisional, because they will evolve and change over time, as the process unfolds.

#### *1) Initial stakeholder mapping.*

Preliminary exploration would involve identification of the important stakeholders involved, including both those actively promoting peace and those who are engaged in ongoing violence or are otherwise direct parties to the conflict. Stakeholder or actor mapping identifies the parties

to the conflict, their interests, demands, sources of power, and so forth. A complementary mapping would analyze the groups and key individuals working for peace, showing who is doing what, where, and addressing which issues.

This stakeholder mapping permits preliminary determination of the range of possible partners in collective efforts, including existing networks or coalitions and their strengths.

## *2) Identification or convening of a "sufficient" network or coalition of interested groups.*

Although the composition of the group(s) is likely to change over time through an iterative process, it is necessary to work with a network that has sufficient reach, both vertical (local to international) and horizontal (across sectors and perspectives) to enable consideration of the questions involved in these initial stages. Subsequent discussions may result in narrowing or expanding of the network, depending partly on the chosen focus (topic, problem, issue, geographic area). From the beginning, it will also be necessary to address issues of power and decision making, to guarantee that, to the extent possible, local actors control the process, and that external actors and funders do not determine the agenda.

## *3) Preliminary conflict analysis.*

The FSG framework calls for development of a shared understanding of the problem at hand. (This will be addressed below as an important component of the FSG condition for a "common agenda.") Even before launching a new collective initiative, it will be important to understand the conflict context. In most conflict settings, local and international groups have performed conflict analyses, and some are willing to share those or have posted them on line. If few such analyses are available or are deemed out-of-date or inadequate, a preliminary analysis engaging multiple local stakeholders will be necessary. Involving a wide range of actors from the beginning will build local ownership of the process.

## *4) Decision regarding the level of collective action.*

CDA's own research has explored the connections between local or community level work on "peace writ little" and efforts at the larger Peace Writ Large level, which could be subnational (province, state...), national or involve international regional dynamics.<sup>5</sup> Collective impacts can be understood at any of these levels, although the stakeholders involved and objectives would be different at the different levels.

Coalitions or networks dedicated to promoting peace could involve a range of levels, including any of the following, or combinations of them:

- Local level coalitions/networks
- National level coalition/networks
- Networks or coordination efforts among international donors
- An international donor and its grantees
- Government peace efforts/commissions (with/without international support)

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<sup>5</sup> See *Confronting War* and forthcoming CDA publication.

Quite apart from the conflicting parties themselves, any of these categories could involve civil society organizations, community-based organizations, national or international NGOs, local/international businesses, national governments, regional intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies/officials, and bilateral/multilateral donors.

Each of these levels represents a different degree of difficulty involved in promoting collective impacts. Work with an entirely local groups of organizations, even with support from international partners and donors, would be relatively straightforward, compared with efforts to organize a national level coalition among peacebuilding groups. Efforts among multiple bilateral donors, while involving a relatively small number of entities, would be complicated by their varied program priorities, bureaucratic and decision making processes, and predetermined funding mandates from parliaments or the equivalent.

### 5) *Preliminary determination of focus and scope.*

In addition to the level and range of stakeholders or partners involved, a preliminary question concerns the scope of the core issue(s) to be addressed. (Note: this must be preliminary, as the process of group formation and determination of focus/scope will be iterative and emergent.)

In our experience working with groups of organizations in the field, the most effective joint efforts focus on a relatively discrete and time-bound issue—although such endeavors can be embedded in a larger and longer-term strategy towards a clear shared vision and concrete goals. Combined work on “peace” or some other lofty long-term goal usually fails due to vagueness and lack of clear outcomes. At the other extreme, efforts focused on a narrow set of activities rarely result in any systemic impact. Therefore, collective impact initiatives must identify achievable objectives that represents significant contributions or stepping stones towards Peace Writ Large, but not so ambitious as to be unrealistic or too long-term.

In terms of the timeframe, in several places (Kenya, Ghana, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau) we have seen successful short-term collective efforts dedicated to achieving a nonviolent election, in which organizations joined in a coalition, secured joint short-term funding, outlined a series of joint activities, assigned specific activities to different organizations, and even divided up territory to ensure geographic coverage of the country. Examples of longer-term efforts exist, but their successes have been less clear.<sup>6</sup> The challenge, therefore, is to undertake a series of shorter term efforts (one to three years) that are each an integral element of a ten-year vision and sustained strategy.

### 6) *“Go/No Go” decision*

After exploring each of the five areas above, it will be important to decide whether there is sufficient interest, shared understanding, and confluence of vision or goals to warrant dedication of focused energy, time and resources to an effort towards collective impact.

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<sup>6</sup> Marin O’Brien Belhoussein’s review (*op. cit.*) provides quick summaries of ten selected examples of relatively successful coordination.



## Permissive Environmental for Collective Impact: leadership, funding, & sense of importance

FSG posits three important *preconditions* that should be established before launching a collective impact effort—which we have renamed as a “permissive environment.” In FSG’s terminology, the preconditions include “an influential champion; adequate financial resources, and a sense of urgency for change.”<sup>7</sup> We have recast these as “leadership, adequate financial resources, and sense of the importance of sustained change.” Even before we approach the five core conditions for impact in the next section, these elements represent real challenges for peacebuilding activities.

### Leadership

In most situations of war and conflict, there is either no single outstanding champion for peace or there are multiple competing champions. Overt leadership for peace is more likely to appear during a “*peacemaking*” phase—efforts to end violence and reach some form of settlement. In these circumstances, leadership can be provided to either build bridges between contending groups or to help articulate an emerging consensus among groups participating in various forms of dialogue or negotiation.

In CDA’s research,<sup>8</sup> we have seen examples where an international/regional power or group (such as in Burundi, Guatemala and the Solomon Islands) or a prominent individual (such as Mandela in the Burundi case) has performed a key leadership role. But we have also seen situations where such leaders ultimately fail, for a range of reasons. The Oslo Accords process (regarding Israel/Palestine), spearheaded by Norway, is an example where initial success was undermined by conditions on the ground.

In some situations, the UN mounts a major *peacekeeping* and peacebuilding operation, as in Liberia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Haiti. However, even when the UN is playing a central role, to the point of essentially running the country (Kosovo, Liberia, East Timor), its ability to generate a common agenda, even among its own agencies, is limited. Bureaucratic instruments (including the UN Development Assistance Framework, Integrated Strategic Framework, Poverty Reduction Strategy, Peacebuilding Fund/Commission, etc.) provide the basis for building a common agenda, but those opportunities are often squandered.

It will be useful to identify different forms of leadership in different substantive areas or to address specific key factors of conflict, rather than looking for one champion to deal with the full complex array of issues. From a systems thinking perspective, we can also consider the notion that “systems change best when systems change themselves.” That is, effective systems change often involves leadership from within the system—or at least someone who can activate people or forces in the system to make and sustain change. This is consistent with the first and second principles from the beginning of this Framework that call for locally led efforts for peace and an appropriate role for outsiders.

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<sup>7</sup> “Channeling Change,” p.3.

<sup>8</sup> Chigas, Diana and Peter Woodrow, 2016 (forthcoming), [untitled manuscript regarding the cumulative impacts of peacebuilding efforts], CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

Experience suggests it would be effective to undertake more narrowly focused campaigns with specific objectives to be achieved within relatively short time frames, yet conceived as building on each other within a longer term strategy. In these cases, an influential leader could inspire groups to join a campaign and articulate how the relatively narrow goals would fit within a larger vision and strategy for Peace Writ Large.

### ***Adequate Financial Resources***

In conflict prevention or in post-war peacebuilding efforts, there is a wide array of issues that need to be dealt with over time.<sup>9</sup> Together, they represent an ambitious agenda for change. Unfortunately, even if donors (and governments) agree on the issues, obtaining long-term commitment of funding for fundamental change processes is difficult. Thus, this requirement represents a challenge for funding peace activities at all phases, especially for prevention.

In the run up to a peace accord, most funding is channeled to *humanitarian* assistance, with only small amounts extended to building support for peace. There tends to be a burst of funding for a wide range of activities during the immediate post-violence phase of “peace consolidation.” But this funding tends to be relatively short term, generally up to three years, is rarely sustained for the long term, and usually fails to address key drivers of conflict.

FSG points out that, once underway, a collective impact effort “can last a decade or more...Collective impact is a marathon, not a sprint. There is no shortcut in the long-term process of social change.”<sup>10</sup> In order to address the fundamental problems that generated violent conflict in the first place, long-term commitment is needed, and is seldom available. Therefore, funding must be sufficient in *amount* to get the work done and sustained, to address issues over ten or more years. This suggests that part of the process will be to generate self-financing processes that are not permanently dependent on external funding.

### ***Sense of the Importance of Sustained Change***

As noted immediately above, in peace efforts, there is usually a sense of urgency to stop violence through ceasefires and development of a peace settlement. This sense of urgency often continues through a brief period of “peace consolidation.” Typically, once the situation has reached a degree of stability, the international community feels that its work is done, attention is diverted to another crisis, and funding dries up. The peace commitment must be sustained beyond short-term urgency and oriented towards sustained efforts for durable change.

There is a short window of opportunity, immediately following the signing of a peace accord for about three years, when weariness with war and widespread acknowledgement of serious problems can create momentum for change. At the same time, there is often a strong push for “normalcy”, a sense that conditions have returned to a tolerable state, and that the government is fully in charge of the situation, which typically results in active discounting of key conflict drivers.

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<sup>9</sup> CDA has identified a range of issues, each of which must be addressed to some degree in its “factor tree” model, based on a series of case studies. See Chigas and Woodrow, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> *Op cit.* p. 4.

Peacebuilding actors can focus energy not so much on urgent action, but rather on long-term commitment to addressing the fundamental causes of conflict. These cannot be confronted with speed or demands for immediate results. "Urgency with patience" is needed, as the issues to be addressed are usually deeply embedded in political culture, social norms and economic systems. Preventing a new cycle of violence must be a priority.

The commitment to change in a post-violence period is attenuated by the desire by governments to assert control and project the image of a return to normal life. Unfortunately, in many settings "normal" conditions include inequitable distribution of resources, neglect of large portions of the population, marginalization/exclusion, favoritism, corruption, and elite struggles for power (among other things). "Business as usual" implies ignoring the factors that resulted in warfare in the first place. A challenge for peacebuilders is to promote an acknowledgement of such key drivers of conflict, and to engage in longer term prevention and development programming that addresses them.

## The Five Conditions for Collective Impact

FSG put forward five basic conditions that must be met in order to achieve collective impact—and these are explored below.<sup>11</sup> These include:

1. Common Agenda
2. Shared Measurement
3. Mutually Reinforcing Activities
4. Continuous Communication
5. Backbone Support

As noted, the FSG model needs significant adjustment to make it applicable in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We have determined that it is necessary to change these basic categories (and subcategories) of the five conditions to make them more appropriate and applicable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The following reframing of the five conditions is suggested—and incorporated into the subsequent discussion below:

1. Collective & Emergent Understanding (conflict analysis, degree of progress, who is doing what)
2. Collective Intention & Action (common agenda, level/scope of action, core strategy, mutually reinforcing activities, division of labor, common measures)
3. Collective Learning & Adaptive Management (seek regular feedback, adjust actions accordingly, emphasize mutual learning)
4. Continuous Communication & Accountability, (continuous data sharing, exchange of experiences, reflection)
5. Sufficient Support Structures (“backbone” support)

An important overarching comment is needed: There can be no generic formula for addressing these conditions; the approach, methods, and processes must be adapted to the specific context. What might work in one setting might seriously backfire in another! Therefore, while the overall categories and subtopics will be important in almost all settings, exactly how to accomplish them will vary considerably. As noted in the first principle at the beginning of this framework document, local people and organizations must drive the process—including whether and how to address these conditions.

The table below presents each of the five conditions (in our revised framing), suggests potential activities for advancing that dimension, identifies potential constraints and challenges, and offers some ideas for mitigating those challenges. As we conduct field testing, we expect to gain insights that will prompt further refinement of these conditions and approaches.

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<sup>11</sup> See FSG articles cited in footnote #2.

## Exploring the Five Conditions for Collective Impact

Collective Impact Condition	Possible Activities in Peacebuilding Contexts	Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<b>1. Collective &amp; Emergent Understanding: Engage in ongoing process of joint conflict analysis and tracking progress</b>			
<b>A</b> Develop a shared understanding/analysis	Perform joint conflict analysis and conflict mapping and/or share existing analyses that identify key drivers of conflict.	The basic framing of the conflict is, itself, often contested. Not all stakeholders are able/willing to engage in joint analysis. Some analyses are not shared. Are all voices/perspectives represented in the analysis? Who “owns” the analysis?	Work only with publicly available documents. Work with contesting parties separately, then combine. Confidential third party amalgamation of analyses.
<b>B</b> Assess current conditions of progress on key driving factors and/or elements of positive change	In addition to conflict analysis, assess the degree of progress (or lack thereof) in key areas of change needed (use of CDA’s “Factor Tree” tool).	Different perceptions of progress and different assessments of what is most important to address, based on interests and experience.	Engage in dialogue about progress made and priorities for action as fundamental exercise in building a coalition/network.
<b>C</b> Map who is doing what—and what has already been tried, with what results	Based on the key drivers and areas of progress or lack thereof (see #1A and #1B), identify which organizations are working on which issues and where there are significant <i>gaps</i> in the number and/or scale of efforts for change. Analyze the success or failure of previous change efforts.	Some activities are, by necessity, confidential or off-the-record. The number of different actors is often enormous—making it difficult to gain a full picture of all efforts. There are likely contending interpretations or analysis of the success/failure of previous efforts.	Map at least the most significant efforts, taking care to note locally-driven efforts that may be less visible. Develop more complete information over time.
<b>D</b> Repeat/update analysis on a regular basis	Update joint analysis regularly, as a “normal” element of group activities.	Time constraints.	

Collective Impact Condition	Possible Activities in Peacebuilding Contexts	Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<b>2. Collective Intention &amp; Action: Develop a common agenda, core strategy, action plan and shared measures</b>			
<b>A</b> Develop a shared vision and goals	Identify a common long-term vision and a series of achievable intermediate goals or building blocks.	The contrasting visions for the future and “peace” may be central to the conflict. Underlying issues regarding inclusion/exclusion, grievances, models of power holding, and equity/justice may impede a shared vision, even among peace proponents. Even if a shared vision is achieved, designation of building blocks or intermediate steps may be difficult.	Agree to principles driving a vision first, then how those would apply in the context. Determine incremental steps towards the vision, rather than major leaps—break issues down into doable parts. Plan ‘backwards’ from a significant achievement to how we got there. Work with those who are willing to join a collective effort.
<b>B</b> Adopt a common overall approach, strategy and theories of change	Within an identified vision and goals, develop a strategy for achieving intermediate goals and an accompanying theory of change.	The system will push back or resist change efforts.	Address system pushback in planning. Ensure that “harm” is not done. Adopt an adaptive management approach to respond to progress, failures and unexpected events. (See #3D)
<b>C</b> Determine priority areas for action	Use the various forms of analysis in #1A, #1B and #1C to identify priority areas for action—especially issues or groups that have been neglected.	Determination of needed scale of efforts often a stretch for organizations accustomed to modest programs.	Engage in exercises that free up imagination and innovation. Work with donors to provide resources for scaling up.
<b>D</b> Differentiate tasks/roles	Use analytical information to identify who is best placed to do tasks, based on experience, capacities, mandates, skills, access, etc. Explore potential linkages and synergies across efforts.	Agencies may compete now or previously. May be hard to openly discuss capacities. Some may be attached to dubious theories of change (favorite methods).	Emphasis mutual learning, based on evidence (hence common measures).

Collective Impact Condition	Possible Activities in Peacebuilding Contexts	Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<b>E</b> Coordinate a plan of action	Build on the differentiated tasks/roles (above), develop an action plan: who will do what, by when, with what resources.	Organizations may resist perceived centralized control or erosion of independence.	Core purpose of coalition and goal of collective impact—requires some level of coordination and adjustment to achieve common agenda.
<b>F</b> Identify shared measures, based on action plan and theories of change: ongoing monitoring	What changes can reasonably be expected from collective activities over what period of time? How can those be measured? How can we track other (unexpected/unintended) effects?	Participants may disagree about what is important to track. Issues of security and access in conflict zones may impede accurate data collection.	Use local organizations for data collection. Build local capacities for survey research and feedback. Utilize crowd sourcing and other emerging technologies. Develop baselines.
<b>3. Collective Learning &amp; Adaptive Management: Seek regular feedback, adjust actions accordingly, adopt shared measures</b>			
<b>A</b> Engage in ongoing process of collaborative learning	Organize processes of mutual reflection/learning to inform further implementation and to capture lessons to inform other efforts.	Time constraints. Distrust or lack of openness to discuss “failures” as well as successes.	Build learning processes into programming, provide useful feedback on a regular basis.
<b>B</b> Collect feedback and analyze data	Analyze together information gathered from shared measures (#2F above). Elicit perceptions and opinions from a full range of stakeholders.	Participants may disagree about expected changes—and how to interpret data.	
<b>C</b> Evaluate regularly	Engage in ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes. Periodically gather additional information and feedback, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, revealing both expected and <i>unexpected</i> changes.		

Collective Impact Condition	Possible Activities in Peacebuilding Contexts	Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<b>D</b> Engage in adaptive management	Use monitoring data, evaluation results and feedback to discuss needed adjustments in program approaches and theories of change.	Some organizations and/or donors may be committed to specific strategies, actions or outputs.	Gain prior commitment from participating organizations and their donors for an adaptive management approach, with clear accountability mechanisms.
<b>4. Continuous Communication &amp; Accountability</b>			
<b>A</b> Engage in mutual accountability	Use information gathered to track progress towards mutual goals and/or to work together to adjust strategies and activities in response to feedback/data.	Participants may resist mutual accountability, preferring independence. Some may question accuracy of data, especially if it contradicts their favored methodologies or approaches. Some donors may refuse to change deliverables or methods.	Address mutual accountability from the beginning of network or coalition formation: meaning, process, decision making, use of data. Encourage experimental attitude, testing theories of change together. Avoid blame. Educate donors and make them part of the adaptive management process.
<b>B</b> Set transparent mechanisms for ongoing internal communication	Ensure a platform for open exchange among members, ongoing decision making, addressing concerns, sharing of information, and planning.	Member time constraints. Potential for misunderstandings or miscommunication regarding important decisions. Tensions may arise between “insiders” (local entities) and “outsiders”.	Use transparent processes for information sharing and decision making. Engage in frank dialogue about appropriate roles for insiders and outsiders, ensure that outsiders support insider initiatives.
<b>C</b> Set mechanisms for ongoing external communications	Identify important external stakeholders and constituencies (publics), the information they need and how it will be provided.		
<b>D</b> Review plans/results periodically	Organize occasions to examine data/feedback received and analyzed	Time constraints. Possible questioning of data/feedback.	



Collective Impact Condition	Possible Activities in Peacebuilding Contexts	Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
	(see #2F and #3 above), and engage in further planning and adjustments needed.	Resistance to adjusting plans (by partners or donors).	
<b>5. Sufficient Support Structures (backbone support)</b>			
<b>A</b> Identify organization(s) to provide staff support for a "secretariat" function	Coordination of activities among partners: meetings, decision making, planning, data collection, communications, fundraising, etc. and other activities outlined above.	Resistance to perceived central control. Competition among members for leadership role and/or associated funding. Perceptions of bias or a hidden agenda.	Explore multiple options for this function: single organization, several organizations, a coordination group. Keep structures light/non-bureaucratic and flexible.